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1. INTRODUCTION:
In recent years demographic trends and longstanding spending commitments have
created a sense of crisis about public pension programmes in OECD countries.  A familiar
scenario is that of the public finances buckling under the weight of ever-bigger cohorts of
aging social security claimants.  One doomsday prediction envisages one-third of U.S. GDP
absorbed by medicare within three decades.  Another forecast of the impact of population
aging on government debt in industrialised countries predicts, on the basis of current
commitments, an average increase in the ratio of debt to GDP of ninety percentage points
between 2000 and 2030.  Few OECD countries can afford to be complacent though, as it
happens, this last forecast is more reassuring about Ireland than anywhere else.
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The context offers an excuse to look back at the beginnings, through the Old Age
Pensions Act of 1908, of public provision of old age social security.  Opponents of such a
measure stressed the likely negative impact on private saving and on charity.  Supporters
highlighted the need for a public response to the increasing insecurity of old age, an
insecurity linked to economic change and the weakening of traditional support networks. 
Indeed it is ironic that the crisis facing social security regimes today comes at a time when the
insecurity attending globalisation is seen by some economists as an argument for more
welfare nets.
3  The 1908 Act, which defined old age as seventy years and over, was the
culmination of a long policy debate.  In political terms, it is usually seen as a Liberal reaction
to the rise of the Labour Party.  The role of factors stressed in the modern political economy
literature on the reform of social security, such as collective action on the part of the elderly
( ￿grey power ￿), or intra-familial or intra-generational altruism, seem not to have impacted on
the historiography so far.
4  The scope of the reform was constrained by resources.  The case
for a means-tested, non-contributory pension at 65 years was rebuffed by the Treasury on3
economy grounds, the sum initially envisaged for the purpose being limited to £6 million in a
full year.  In the event, the pension cost much more than envisaged, mainly because the
number of Irish claimants was seriously underestimated.  This was one of the main reasons
for Lloyd George ￿s  ￿People ￿s Budget ￿ of 1909/10 and the ensuing constitutional crisis.
5
Ireland did not feature much in the pre-1908 policy debates about the pension.  Irish
nationalist politicians had not sought such a measure, nor were they consulted beforehand on
its implications for Ireland.
6  Yet the legislation would have more far-reaching ramifications
in Ireland than in any other part of the United Kingdom.  Three months after its inception
28.3 per cent of those drawing the pension lived in Ireland; two years later, after the purging
of thousands of bogus claims in Ireland
7 and big increases in the number of claimants in
Britain in the wake of amending legislation, Ireland ￿s share was still 22.2 per cent.  Ireland ￿s
shares of  total U.K. population and those of pensionable age were small by comparison,
one-in-ten and one-in-seven, respectively.
When pension officials embarked on a more rigorous assessment of Irish claims in
1909, they were described by one Irish M.P. as being in the  ￿particularly foolish and not very
admirable position of men who have done good by accident, and now blush to find how
expensive it is, and are trying to diminish the cost of the good they have done ￿. There is
certainly something to this; in the first quarter of 1909, with a fiscal crisis beckoning and
spending on the pension £0.9 million over target, the Chancellor conceded that Irish claims
should be subjected to closer scrutiny.
8  How different would the scheme have been had the
government correctly predicted its cost must remain a moot point in what follows. However,
there is no evidence of the pension being a product of the conciliatory public policy
highlighted in the historiography of fin-de-siècle Ireland.  Nor is it likely that any  Home Rule
administration would have dreamt up something so generous or re-distributive.
The provisions of the 1908 Act entitled men and women aged seventy years or more,
resident in the UK for the previous two decades, and whose annual means did not exceed
£31 10s., to a weekly pension.  The act disqualified habitual drunkards, convicts, malingerers,
and pauper lunatics; persons previously in receipt of Poor Law relief were also disqualified at4
first (though only until January 1911).  Claimants whose income did not exceed £21 were
entitled to the full five shillings a week.  The entitlement decreased on a sliding scale by a
shilling per £2 12s. 6d. of extra income until the upper annual income upper limit of £31 10s.
was reached.  In the event, most claimants received the full five shillings.
The extensive reportage in the Irish national and provincial press of the first pension
day was symptomatic of the pension ￿s significance for Ireland.  All accounts convey the
importance of the occasion and several its sometimes humorous and poignant aspects.  In
rural Roscommon neighbours ferried  ￿cartloads of aged female pensioners ￿ to the post office. 
In Abbeyfeale in county Limerick one sceptical old-timer asked the post mistress  ￿if the
money was any good ￿.   In Galway two very elderly pensioners wondered out loud why they
could not claim  ￿back time ￿.  In Birr, county Offaly, a 93-year old woman fell ill on the way
home from the post office,  ￿not having been out of doors for many years before ￿.  In
Ballymoney in north Antrim,  ￿the movements of the pensioners to and from the office were
watched by a large crowd of spectators but the best of good humour prevailed ￿.  In Dublin,
where many of the female claimants seemed younger than seventy, one  ￿youthful-looking ￿
lady declared indignantly that she had attended a meeting at the Custom House to celebrate
the battle of Balaclava  --  ￿not altogether conclusive evidence that she had passed the 70
limit ￿.  In Waterford too most of the pensioners were  ￿active and healthy, not to say brisk ￿,
and some seemed under the required age.  The Freeman ￿s Journal, drawing attention to the
numerous claimants whose outward appearance suggested people who would not seek public
charity, noted that helping the  ￿genteel poor ￿ was in the spirit of the legislation.  However, in
neighbouring Kingstown, one old lady who objected to mixing with her social inferiors in the
pension queue took some persuading before she stood in line like everybody else.  In Ennis,
county Clare, where the post-office opened its doors at 7 a.m., the rush three hours later
required a police presence to keep order.  In Gort, county Galway, the police formed a queue
of claimants.  In Dublin ￿s General Post Office the first recipient, Mrs. Ellen Canning of
North Gloucester Place, signed her order with a mark.  The inability of pensioners to sign
was a widely noted feature; in Tralee  ￿not one in forty ￿ could sign.
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 The impact of the pension highlighted Ireland ￿s relative poverty on the eve of
independence.  Five shillings (5s.) was a considerable sum in Ireland in 1908.  In rural Ireland
in the 1900s an unskilled labourer in good health might earn no more than double that; in
Britain he would expect 15s. to 20s.  For elderly women the gains were even greater.  In Irish
towns and cities unskilled female wages ranged from 7s. to 12s., while domestic outwork in
the congested districts in the west brought only 4s. to 7s. a week.  The gains to small farm
households containing a pensioner or two are more difficult to estimate, but the once-
confidential  ￿baseline reports ￿ of the Congested Districts Board, compiled by the board ￿s
officers in the remote rural west in the 1890s, yield some insight into the pension ￿s impact in
Ireland poorest regions.  The congested districts, originally defined as areas comprising
district electoral divisions with a poor law valuation per head of £1.50 or less, contained over
half a million people in the 1890s, or about one-tenth of the population.  Each of the eighty-
four  ￿baseline reports ￿ contains an estimate of the annual cash income of a household in
average circumstances in some congested district.  The average (either unweighted or
weighted by population) per district works out at £39, with a standard deviation of £10.
10 
True, such a sum would usually have been supplemented by income in kind represented by
potatoes, milk, and a few other items produced for home consumption, but an additional £13
in the form of an old age pension would still have bulked large in such circumstances.
As noted above, the 1908 Act excluded those in receipt of poor relief from the
pension, but from January 1911 men and women over seventy hitherto on outdoor relief
were eligible.  The big gap between the average weekly sum granted to those on outdoor
relief in Ireland and in England and Wales is thus another indication of the gains to Irish old
age pensioners.  On the eve of the 1908 Act, when outdoor relief was confined mainly to
people unable to work through illness or age, the average payment in Ireland was about 1s.
6d. per week, while in England and Wales it was 2s. 6d. per week.
11
Just before independence in 1921-2 the pension still represented a boon to the aged
poor in Ireland, though its relative worth had declined a little.  By then the full pension had
doubled to 10s., mainly in response to rising prices, while the mean male agricultural wage6
had risen by about 150 per cent to 26s.-28s., and women ￿s wages in the cities had trebled.
12 
Contemporary accounts argue that the pension had done much for the quality of life of old
people, giving them a new dignity, and producing a massive income transfer to many of those
who needed it most.
13  
The 1908 Act was arguably the most radical and far-reaching piece of welfare
legislation enacted in Ireland in the twentieth century.  In macroeconomic terms the fiscal
transfer was considerable, representing about 1.6 per cent of Irish national income in the first
few years (Table 1).  In poorer regions in the west where household incomes were half the
national average and the proportion of elderly people higher, the transfer must have
represented 4-5 per cent of income.  In Britain at the outset the pension was worth 0.4 per
cent of national income; in the United States, where at federal level Old Age Assistance was
part of Roosevelt ￿s New Deal, it was worth marginally more, about 0.5 per cent.
14  A boon
before independence, as we shall see, the old pension would represent a considerable fiscal
burden for the new Irish administration after 1922.  But even during the Irish Civil War of
1922-3 the pension was an issue.  The army ￿s commander in the west, Commandant General
Austen Brennan, proposed to suspend old age pension payments in certain parts of
Connemara  ￿with a view to withdrawing monetary support from families, members of which
he has reason to believe are actively supporting the irregular forces and assisting them in the
destruction of bridges, blocking or roads, etc. ￿  He reasoned that £1 a week represented a
considerable sum in such poor districts, and that as long as it was forthcoming  ￿the younger
male members of the family are left free from the assistance hitherto rendered towards the
upkeep of the home ￿, and thus free to resist the forces of the state.  Against advice that such
a measure would embarrass the government and punish the innocent pensioner for the
misdeeds of others, Finance Minister Ernest Blythe  was  ￿[f]or the time being... disposed to
agree with the proposed action ￿.
15
Much more has been written about the history of the old age pension in Britain than
in Ireland, where its impact was much more far-reaching.
16  This paper does not offer a
comprehensive survey of the pension, but seeks to throw a little light on some of its more7
interesting aspects.  Part 2 is about the age-misreporting and  ￿welfare fraud ￿, much
commented on by contemporaries, to which the pension gave rise.  Part 3 discusses the
impact of the pension on the operation of the poor law in Ireland.  Part 4 and 5 are is about
the political economy and the party politics of the pension in the Irish Free State.  Part 6
concludes.
TABLE 1: THE OLD AGE PENSION, GDP,  AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE (G)
Year    Pension  Payments (% of)    Population (%
  Payments (£m.) GNP    G over pension age)
UK
1910 10 0.4  4.3 3.1
1930 54 1.2  5.0 9.6
Ireland
1910 2.4 1.6 27.8
17  6.7
1930 2.7 2.1 13.2 5.7
Sources: 
UK: Johnson,  ￿Parallel histories of retirement ￿, 213; the 1910 figure seems to
include Ireland.
Ireland (whole island), 1910: The Earl of Dunraven, The Finances of Ireland, (London,
1912), 124, 127; Irish national income is assumed to have been £150 million c. 1910;
Vaughan and Fitzpatrick, Irish Population Statistics, 81.
Ireland (Irish Free State), 1930: Statistical Abstract, 1931;Vaughan and Fitzpatrick,
Irish Population Statistics, 91.
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2.  ￿TELL A GOOD ONE WHILE YER AT IT! ￿  LYING ABOUT AGE:
     With fewer inhabitants than Scotland by a quarter of a million, Ireland has
established claims to nearly 74,000 more pensions.  This surely is a major
tribute to the longevity of our race, and to the healthy character of our much-
abused climate.
    Irish Times (1 January 1909)
     ￿Grateful thanks to the Sacred Heart of Jesus for obtaining my Old Age
Pension five years before it was due ￿.
  Thanksgiving notice in a provincial newspaper
18
     Well, well, I never thought I ￿d get it, I thought they ￿d want to know what
me rale age was, or some such hocus pocus!  I wonder what age he put me
down --  76!  Oh, tell a good one while yer at it!
Character in Percy French sketch (French, 1929: 199)
     A lady from Ireland in Gateshead could only say she definitely remembered
having seen a pig of a phenomenal size killed in her native village, and this
incident being proved to have taken place 70 years ago, her claim was
admitted.
Connaught Telegraph, 2 January 1909
   Though the old age pension was means-tested, in late March 1909 the number of
pensioners in Ireland almost matched the number declaring themselves to be aged seventy
years or more in 1901.  In England and Wales the proportion was 44 per cent, in Scotland 54
per cent (Table 3).  Though much of the difference can be attributed to relative Irish poverty,
there was also a good deal of what would today be called  ￿welfare fraud ￿.  Why and how
much?  It is notorious that because Ireland lacked a system of civil registration until 1864,
hard evidence on claimants ￿ ages in the 1900s and the 1910s was sometimes hard to come by,
leaving plenty scope for age-falsification. Throughout the country old people  -- and many
not so old  --  testified to  ￿eating a potato out of [their] hand on the night of the  ￿Big Wind ￿ in9
1839, so much so that remembering the  ￿Big Wind ￿ soon had to be discarded as a gauge of
age.  In his memoirs Sir Henry Robinson would describe the  ￿the bent, decrepit attitude and
the high quavering voice peculiar to applicants for old-age pensions ￿.
19   
In the absence of civil registration and the relevant parish registers, some early
claimants were granted the pension on the say-so of a priest or medical officer.  However,
official gullibility went only so far;   ￿mere expressions of opinion ￿ on the part of such people
did not guarantee the pension for long.  A complete revision of the original lists was ordered. 
In the year ending 31st March 1909 over forty-three thousand Irish pensions claims were
rejected or pensions revoked, and in the following three years over double that number. 
Increasingly the Local Government Board (henceforth LGB) turned to the manuscript forms
of the 1841 and 1851 censuses, which were kept as part of the public record in the Four
Courts, for proof of age.  Total accuracy was impossible; the LGB decided that somebody
included in the 1851 census at eleven years would be entitled to claim for April 1910.  The
reaction of nationalist Ireland is captured in the dismissal by Irish M.P.s of the censuses of
1841 and 1851 as  ￿notoriously inaccurate ￿ and  ￿misleading ￿, having being prepared  ￿by certain
illiterate policemen ￿  and the claim in the weekly Leader  that striking off existing pensioners
on the basis of census evidence was illegal.
20  Irish members kept up a stream of
parliamentary questions about rejected claims.
21
However, these censuses were widely acknowledged to be reliable in their coverage,
and it is a tribute to their reliability that if deserving claimants knew where they had been
born, they were rarely missing in the census. Between 1910 and 1922 the staff of the Irish
Public Record Office  provided a search service for would-be pensioners, carrying out nearly
thirty thousand searches of age in the 1841 and 1851 censuses.  About three-quarters of these
were successful.
22  Applicants provided what information they could by letter and where there
was enough detail a search was carried out.  When the relevant household was found in either
the 1841 or 1851 census forms and the applicant identified, a certified copy of the return was
issued on payment of two shillings. 10
Officials seem to have done their best to be helpful.  In 1917, for example, Mary
Sullivan with an address in Newport, Monmouthshire, wrote giving the names of her parents,
Daniel and Ellen, and her residence in 1851 as Dunamark, Kilmocomogue, Bantry.  The
PRO searched through both 1841 and 1851 records without success.  They also searched
Bantry town where they found several households headed by Daniel and Ellen Sullivans, but
not the applicant ￿s.  The PRO reply asked the applicant for more detail on where and with
whom she was living in 1851, and advised her to present a prayer book mentioning the date
1868 and her marriage certificate, if it reported her age, to the pensions officer.  But  ￿that is all
we can do for you ￿   A query from the U.S. from Julia, daughter of Cornelius and Mary
Connor, also failed to find a match.  However, the search revealed a Julia, six year-old
daughter of Charles and Mary Connor.  The reply from Dublin asked whether her father was
known by any other name, and also for a list of brothers and sisters.  The bulk of the
unsuccessful searches seem to have been submitted on behalf of people who were of less
than pensionable age, or who provided imprecise addresses.  For example, a search was
carried out in February 1917 for Bridget Foran of Athea, County Limerick, illegitimate
daughter of Patrick Foran and Mary Kiely.  The heads of family in 1851 were given as John
and Johanna Kiely, of Aughrim, Murher, Iraghticonnor, Kerry.  John and Johanna were
traced, along with a daughter, Mary Kiely aged 24.  However, there was no trace of either
Patrick or Bridget Foran.  Another search for  Johanna McCarthy located her parents, but
they were still childless in 1851; while Anastasia Cronin found in 1917 that she was only one
year old in 1851.
23
Recourse to the 1841 and 1851 censuses was a sensible response to the problem posed
by the pension.  The downside was that it virtually guaranteed deliberate mis-reporting on a
grand scale in the Irish census of 1911.  When Austen Chamberlain warned Irish secretary
Augustine Birrell in 1910 that accepting census returns as proof of age would  ￿put a premium
on false returns ￿ in future, Birrell conceded that this was  ￿rather an interesting question ￿.
24  In
1911 some lied in order to maintain consistency with false declarations on their pension
applications, others in case the 1911 census might be used in evidence against a future claim. 11
Ireland ￿s census commissioner denied that there was a problem, declaring that the pension
had merely induced the elderly to  ￿ascertain their correct age ￿.
25  But that was far from being
so.  The pensioners almost ruined the 1911 census as a source of information on ages.
The problem is evident from Tables 2 and 3.  The proxies for  ￿survival ￿ in Table 2,
necessarily somewhat crude, are calculated as follows.  The first entry (0.781) refers to the
 ￿survival rate ￿ of men aged 45-54 years in 1861 as represented by the ratio of men aged 55-64
years in the census of 1871 to that of men aged ten years younger in 1861, and likewise for all
other numbers.  The age-cohorts were chosen to minimize the impact of age-heaping; no
allowance can be made for the impact of emigration or return in these age-groups.  The
survival rates are steady enough between the 1860s and the 1890s, but note in particular the
huge rise in the survival rates of older age cohorts in 1911.  We can only guess at the number
of genuine over-seventies in Ireland in 1911.  If, as in England and Wales and in Scotland, the
elderly tended to underestimate their age in the 1901 census, the true number aged seventy
and over in Ireland in 1911 may have been about 200,000.  This implies that nearly one-third
of those who claimed to be seventy or over in 1911 had not yet reached that age.
26 
Alternatively, assuming 180,000 over-seventies in 1911 implies that nearly two-fifths of those
claiming to be over seventy were not.
__________________________________________________________________
TABLE 2:  COHORT SURVIVAL RATES, 1861-1911
Age-Cohort (Male) 1861-71 1871-81 1881-91 1891-01 1901-11
45-54 .781 .765 .763 .774 .708
55-64 .546 .518 .538 .591 .851
65-74 .448 .419 .416 .412 .550
45-74 .642 .600 .610 .641 .728
Age-Cohort (Female)
45-54 .771 .762 .746 .756 .661
55-64 .504 .489 .513 .553 .935
65-74 .458  .415 .428 .402 .611
45-74 .622 .592 .597 .559 .636
   Source: derived from census reports, 1861-1911
__________________________________________________________________________________12
 _____________________________________________________________________________
TABLE 3: OLD AGE AND PENSION ENTITLEMENTS
E & W Scotland Ireland
[1]  Aged 70+ in 1901 (1,000s) 888.1 129.7 187.3
[2]  OAPs in 1909 (1,000s) 393.7   70.3 183.5
[3]  OAPs in 1911 (1,000s) 613.7   91.8 201.8
[4]  Aged 70+ in 1911 (1,000s) 1071.8 153.3 294.9
[4]    [2]/[1]  0.44  0.54  0.98
[5]    [3]/[1]  0.69  0.71  1.07
[6]    [3]/[4]  0.57  0.60  0.68
    Source: B.R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics; Vaughan and Fitzpatrick, Irish Population
Statistics; Appendix Table A2.
_____________________________________________________________________________
 
Nor did the age-misreporting end in 1911.  The 1926 census, conducted against a
backdrop of official efforts at stricter enforcement of the means test, also produced deliberate
age-misreporting on a significant scale.  In the 1920s manuscript censal data were no longer
available as a check on age.
27
As Table 3 shows the number of pensioners in 1911 marginally exceeded our guess at
the number of genuine septuagenarians.  This does not mean that every septuagenarian got
the pension, since an unknown number of successful claims were based on false statements
about age.  But lying in the census was one thing; getting away with lying to the  LGB was
quite another.  The following data give a sense of the problem.   Assuming two hundred
thousand septuagenarians in 1911 and that three-quarters of genuine septuagenarians got the
pension (compared to about seventy per cent in Great Britain) would mean that in 1911 over
50,000 (or 201,800-150,000) pensions went to under-70s.   Assuming that four-fifths of
genuine septuagenarians got the pension would mean that (201,800 - 160,000) 40,000 under-
70s obtained one.  And so on.  Clearly the outcome is highly sensitive to our guesses at
misreporting and genuine claims (Table 4). The old age fraudsters could have cost the
Treasury anything between £0.3 million and £0.8 million annually.  13
_____________________________________________________________
TABLE 4: ESTIMATES OF BOGUS CLAIMANTS c. 1911 (1,000s)
Percent of genuine elderly obtaining pension
Really aged 70+  0.75 0.80 0.90
   in 1911 -----------------------------------------
----------
180,000 66.8 57.8 39.8
200,000 51.8 41.8 21.8
_____________________________________________________________
In mitigation, age-misreporting was positively correlated with poverty.  An analysis of
Ulster farmer and labouring families in 1911 found the following pattern (Table 5):
____________________________________________________________________
TABLE 5: ESTIMATED AGE EXAGGERATION IN RURAL ULSTER (YEARS)
Males Females Males Females
Valuation Religion
£1-£10 2.94 2.47 Catholics 3.55 2.94
£11-£30 2.17 1.69 Other 1.69 1.43
£31 + 0.64 1.45
Literate 2.07 1.76 Housing
Illiterate 3.51 2.96 Worst 3.46 2.30
Medium 2.14 1.96
Servants on farm Best 1.07 1.41
None 2.55 2.13
One 1.76 1.34
More than one 0.37 1.19
Source: Ó Gráda,  ￿Did Ulster Catholics, 86.
_______________________________________________________________
For some further analysis of the variation in misreporting across Ireland ￿s thirty-two
counties we define as a proxy for age-misreporting  (MISREP)  the proportional increase in a14
county in the 1911 and 1901 percentages of the population aged seventy and above.  This
necessarily rough-and-ready measure of misreporting in 1911 variable was subject to
considerable variation across the country (from 30 per cent to 140 per cent).  It was greatest
in a group of contiguous counties in the west and northwest (Cavan, Sligo, Leitrim, Mayo,
Donegal, and Galway), and least in counties Wicklow, Down, and Kildare.  There were
strong correlations between MISREP, on the one hand, and variables proxying the
importance of farming and the standard of living, on the other.  This is clear from Table 6
which, in the spirit of Table 5, reports the results of regressing MISREP on a range of
variables representing economic or cultural conditions.  The explanatory variables are:
 PCILLIT:   the proportion of illiterates in the population aged forty and over
VALPOP: poor law valuation per capita
MINIFARM: the proportion of agricultural holdings rated at £7 or less
 PCCATH: the Catholic share of the population
AGROCC:  the proportion of the labour force in agriculture
URBAN: a dummy variable for the presence of a city or county borough. 
Mapping MISREP, OAPPROP (ratio of pensioners to the total population aged seventy and
over in 1901) and the first five of the above variables shows close matches between
OAPPROP, MISREP, and AGROCC, and VALPOP.  AGROCC alone accounts for more
than two-thirds of the variation in MISREP and its inclusion in the regression analysis
described in Table 6 swamps variables such as PCCATH.  The results make sense.  The most
important elasticities (evaluated at the mean values of the variables) are -0.2 to -0.4 for
VALPOP and +0.7 for AGROCC.  Table 7 describes the results of regressing OAPPROP on
the variables described above.  The signs are as expected, with proxies for poverty accounting
for a significant share of the variation.  AGROCC again packs considerable explanatory
punch.  Note, however, how the inclusion of MISREP adds hugely to the explanatory power
of the regressions.  Granted the cheating on grounds of age, the pension nonetheless seems15
to have targeted those most in need.
_________________________________________________________________
     TABLE 6: ACCOUNTING FOR THE VARIATION IN MISREPORTING
   [1]    [2]    [3]  
CONST 0.661 0.330 0.316
(3.93) (1.72) (1.42)











2 0.270 0.471 0.476
Note:  t-statistics in parentheses
__________________________________________________________________16
__________________________________________________________________
     TABLE 7: ACCOUNTING FOR THE VARIATION IN OAPPROP
   [1]    [2]    [3]  [4] 
CONST 0.989 1.065 0.886 0.596
(5.20) (5.03) (5.40) (8.08)
VALPOP -47.03 -53.52 -47.56 -0.015
(-1.86) (-2.02) (-2.22) (-1.54)
SMALLFARM 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.002








2 0.382 0.397 0.569 0.926
Note:  t-statistics in parentheses
__________________________________________________________________
Most of the complaints against the LGB and the pension officers came from the
nationalist side.   ￿It appears to me rather anomalous ￿, noted one Unionist M.P. in 1909,  ￿for
members below the gangway, who never miss an opportunity of expressing their hatred of
everything British, of every benefit as well as of every evil which comes from the Union, but
they should never miss an opportunity of getting up to claim the last penny from the British
Treasury ￿.  In our sample from rural Ulster in 1911 Catholics were more likely to exaggerate
their age in hopes of obtaining the pension, but our regression results suggest poverty rather
than Catholicity per se is the better predictor of the propensity to cheat.
2817
Adam Smith ￿s counsel that taxation should be  ￿certain, and not arbitrary ￿
29 would seem
to apply equally to welfare benefits such as the old age pension.  But what if transparency is
difficult and costly to achieve?  From the outset there was a double ambiguity in Ireland
about pension entitlements.  First, as noted above, there was no universally applicable way of
establishing claimants ￿ ages.  Ministerial spokesmen explained that in cases where the local
pension committee admitted a claim about age, the pension officer would use his discretion
in deciding whether an appeal to the LGB against the pension committee ￿s decision  was
warranted ￿.  LGB secretary Alexander Barlas stated that  ￿the Board regard the pensions
officer as rather sympathetic.  He does not appeal, as a rule, except in bad cases. In a great
number of cases no evidence of age comes up at all.  A person says:  ￿I am seventy, I was at
school with so-and-so, who is about the same age ￿.
30   But the sense that the Board took a
tough line against claimants would endure.
However, the lack of transparency was not confined to age.  Assessment of statements
about means was more arbitrary still, and left the authorities open to further suspicion and
resentment.  When asked by an Irish M.P. late in 1908 how the incomes of small farmers
would be assessed, Lloyd George replied that pension officers would have to exercise their
discretion in processing with  ￿this class of case ￿.   A few months later another Irish member
complained that  ￿the action of the Local Government Board, in deciding against appeals
under the Act, has been wrapped from beginning to end in a sort of Star Chamber secrecy ￿. 
But the Board, inundated by claims, faced an unenviable task.  In the Commons Birrell
produced a claim from one farmer holding 252 acres as a specimen of scores of   ￿most
difficult and complicated ￿ balance sheets sent to his officials.  These were by no means  ￿the
short and simple annals of the poor ￿.  In its annual report for 1912-3 the LGB lamented the
dissatisfaction that invariably followed when it overrode the decisions of locally-appointed
pension committees.  The Board rejected demands for sworn inquiries into its own decisions,
arguing that fairness would require closer scrutiny of cases both allowed and disallowed.  This
would create great unease for existing pensioners, and  ￿lead to no results commensurate with
the cost which would be involved ￿.
31 18
  Producing clear-cut, accurate assessments of the means of the rural self-employed
was never going to be easy.  That is presumably why the LGB never applied the means test
stringently in Ireland, and why the overwhelming majority of pensioners received the full
pension.  In the 1920s Finance Minister Ernest Blythe would try to reduce the outlay on the
pension by countering this tradition, and getting the pensions officers to re-assess the
incomes of claimants.  However, the precise mechanism for assessing claims would remain
hidden.  In June 1924 Blythe ￿s colleague James A. Burke, Minister for Local Government,
declared that his  ￿present attitude ￿ was to deal strictly with applicants whose families could
look after them, but  ￿not to be too particular in looking for absolute evidence as to whether
the applicant is over seventy years ￿ if the applicant was plainly destitute.  He added that
 ￿[m]any looked upon the old age pensions as fair game for anybody when the British were
administering them.  It was looked upon as legitimate for everybody to get his money when it
was not the Irish taxpayer exclusively that was paying it ￿.
32
The new stringency compounded the belief that the pensions officers  -- the officials
who investigated claims and entitlements  -- and Burke ￿s Department of Local Government
were over-rigorous and unreasonable.  In January 1925 Blythe accepted a motion from a
Farmers ￿ Party deputy for the creation of a select committee to enquire into how pensions
applications were processed.  The Committee ￿s report broadly supported the existing
procedures, and blamed tensions between pension committees and pension officers on the
apathy and neglect of duty of the former.  Several witnesses expressed the view that the
pension committees no longer wielded any power; whenever a difference arose between them
and a pensions officer, the latter ￿s appeal was nearly always upheld.  The report made it plain
that the Department of Local Government (successor to the LGB), which sanctioned
pensions, tended to side with the pensions officers.
33  Whence the complaint from Fianna
Fáil deputy Seán T. O ￿Kelly in the Dáil about  ￿a general feeling... not confined to any Party in
the House, that the administration of the Old Age Pensions Act by the officials in the
Department of Finance, who are naturally acting under the instructions of the Minister, has
been too severe ￿.
34  Both the LGB and Cumann na nGaedheal had chosen to live with less19
than complete transparency.  In 1932 Fianna Fáil would chose the alternative solution of
increasing transparency by broadening entitlement.  By 1936, when false declarations of age
no longer offered a route to a pension, seventy-five percent of those aged over seventy 
qualified.
3.  THE PENSION AND THE POOR LAW:
Dora Costa has recently shown how the introduction of Old Age Assistance in the
United States in the 1930s led to a substantial shift in the housing arrangements of older non-
married women.  Old Age Assistance reduced the cost of independent living, inducing a
significant proportion of such women to live on their own (Costa 1997).  In Ireland, the Old
Age Pension is also held to have influenced the housing arrangements of the elderly, but the
response was conditioned by the presence of the Irish poor law of 1838.  For poor elderly
men and women lacking the family support network that worked tolerably well for the
majority the workhouses established under the poor law of 1838 remained the main safety
net.  At the turn of the century Ireland ￿s  ￿unions ￿ or  ￿poorhouses ￿ housed about forty
thousand people, one per cent of the entire population.  The elderly were disproportionately
represented; in 1901 men and women aged seventy years or more accounted for only four per
cent of the entire population, but for more than one workhouse inmate in five.
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The pension reduced admissions into the workhouses, since it placed the elderly in a
better bargaining position against family members who might previously have consigned
them to the workhouse.  T.C. Murray ￿s one-act play,  ￿Spring ￿, offers a theatrical
representation of these forces at work.  An old man ￿s excitement at news of the pension
scheme proves too much for him, but at least his death deprives his daughter-in-law, who had
wanted him sent to the union workhouse, of  ￿one brown penny of the pension ￿.   T.C.
Murray ￿s play was inspired by Joseph Campbell ￿s  ￿The old age pensioner ￿, which reads in
part:
36
   20
For fifty years he trenched his field
   That he might eat a freeman ￿s bread:
The seasons baulked him of their yield,
   His children ￿s children wished him dead.
But ransom came to him at length
   At the ebb tide of life and strength.
And so he sits with folded hands
   Over the flag of amber fire:
He blinks and nods and understands
   He has his very soul ￿s desire.
In dew wetted, in tempest blown,
   A Lear at last come to his own. 
Given the increased incentive for carers, there is a presumption in favour of a shift
from workhouse to the home.  What was the outcome?  I have little to add here to
Guinnane ￿s findings, published in 1993.  Data on workhouse inmates in the 1901 and 1911
census reports are consistent with a pensions effect.  The number of inmates aged 70 years
and over fell by 17.5 per cent in the interim, almost double the decline in the number of
inmates aged less than seventy.  The poor law statistics also show a huge drop in the numbers
relieved both inside and outside the workhouses between 1907/8 and 1913/4.
37  The
proportionate decline in the number of workhouse inmates was nearly one-fifth, while the
average number on outdoor relief fell by one-third.  A closer look at underlying data (see
appendix table A4) reveals a particularly big drop in the number of aged/infirm inmates in
the half-year ending April 1911.  This is explained by the removal of the pauper
disqualification in January 1911, which had an even more dramatic effect on the numbers
claiming outdoor relief (Table 8):21
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TABLE 8: NUMBERS ON RELIEF  DEC. 1910-JAN. 1911
     Date Aged and infirm       Outdoor relief
Dec 24 1910     13,024 54,431
Dec 31 1910     13,098 51,858
Jan 7 1911     11,635 40,091
Jan 14 1911     11,694 39,311
Source:  LGB, Report 1910/11, pp. xxiii, 201 
_________________________________________________
The records of Lismore Poor Law Union in west Waterford give a local, more
intimate, perspective on these shifts.
38  Table 9 captures the impact of the pension on
outdoor relief, and shows big falls in the numbers of adult males and females   ￿permanently
disabled ￿ by old age or debility, and their dependents.  As noted earlier, the pension was a
boon to such people, trebling their welfare income; other categories on outdoor relief were
unaffected.  Our focus in Tables 10a and 10b  is on men and women aged seventy years or
over admitted before and after the introduction of the pension.  The numbers involved were
small, and they represented only a small proportion of all admissions (about 3.6 per cent of all
admissions in 1906/7 and 2.7 percent in 1909/11).  Moreover, both before and after the
introduction of the pension a significant proportion  ￿   over one-fifth   ￿   of admissions were
repeat admissions, mainly of tramps or  ￿casuals ￿.  With some exaggeration the LGB compared
these  ￿casuals ￿ to   ￿a stage army that passes and repasses the line of vision in such a way as to
convey the idea of multitudes far in excess of the number concerned ￿.
39  Lax record-keeping
means that we cannot tell how long inmates stayed, nor indeed how many of them died in the
workhouse.  
Tables 10a and 10b distinguish between once-off and repeat admissions.   Those
described as  ￿ill ￿ were suffering from a wide range of ailments including debility, catarrh,
influenza, cancer, senility, arthritis, sciatica, bone fractures, rheumatism.  Some of them, such
as 90-year old Daniel Gearn who had cancer of the ear and 70-year old William McCarthy22
who was suffering from senile dementia, entered the workhouse several times.  Both Gearn
and McCarthy were married men, so presumably they opted for home care when they could. 
Age-related illnesses were the most common.  In both 1906-8 and 1909-11 those who
entered more than once were most likely to be single males, though the most frequent entrant
of all in both periods was Mary Maher, a local beggarwoman.   Note that both before and
after 1908 married or widowed entrants were much more likely to be ill.
40  The main
differences between the two periods  --  and they are rather striking  --  are:
- the reduction in the number of healthy repeat male admissions
- the reduction in the number of healthy widowers
- the proportionate reduction in the number of male admissions
These effects need to be set in context.  Before 1908 most elderly Irish people lived in
nuclear, extended, or stem family households  Partly because of the stigma attached to
consigning dependents to the workhouse or allowing them die there, relatively few of those
who had ever married and had surviving children living in Ireland lived alone.  In Guinnane ￿s
household samples from the 1901 and 1911 censuses only 7-8 per cent of those aged over
seventy lived alone; over eighty per cent lived in simple or extended families.
41  Such
considerations set a limit on the potential impact of the pension. To take the example of
Lismore again, the censuses of 1901 and 1911 list the inmates of its workhouse on the nights
of 31 March 1901 and 2 April 1911.  On both dates about half of the inmates aged seventy or
over were in the infirmary, and several of the others were described as  ￿decrepit ￿ or  ￿blind ￿. 
On both dates too only a small minority had a living spouse (five out of thirty-seven in 1901,
two out of thirty-eight in 1911). This helps explain why in Guinnane ￿s model of the
determinants of the decline in indoor relief the pension and the workhouse turn out to be
rather weak substitutes.
42  
Moreover, disaggregating the workhouse data by category of inmate complicates
somewhat the story presented above. Like Lismore, most workhouses doubled as hospitals23
for the poor, and workhouse infirmaries held over one-third of all workhouse inmates.   ￿Aged
and infirm ￿ inmates accounted for another third of the total in the early 1900s.  As noted, in a
nod to the principles of 1834, the 1908 Act explicitly excluded these people, but the pension
might be expected to have had an impact at the margin.  There was a big drop in the average
number of  ￿aged and infirm ￿ inmates after 1908.  However, there were significant drops too
in the numbers of children aged under fifteen, of mentally ill or retarded inmates, and of
mothers-to-be.  Only the numbers using the workhouse infirmaries failed to drop off much.
43 
Improving economic conditions may partly explain the reduction in the number of elderly
inmates after 1908.24
____________________________________________________________________
Table 9: NUMBERS ON OUTDOOR RELIEF LISTS, 
LISMORE POOR LAW UNION 1910-1912
  Half-year ending
-----------------------------------------------------------------
30/9/10 31/3/11 30/9/11 31/3/12
Adult males permanently
disabled by OA/debility 19 20  7  5
  Wives of same 10  9  1  0
  Children of same  7  7  0  0
Adult males suffering
from illness or accident  6  2  9 11
  Wives of same  6  1  7  8
  Children of same 12  2 26 31
Adult females permanently
disabled by OA/debility 51 48 20 20
  Children of same  0  1  0  0
Adult females suffering 
from illness or accident  1  0  0  0
Widows with 2 or more
dependent children 10  8 10 10
  Children of same 30 26 30 29
Lunatics, idiots  4  4  3  3
Orphans  4  3  4  4
Relieved provisionally
Males  7  8 10  6
Females  6 11 10  7




 TABLE 10a:  HEALTH AND MARITAL STATUS, LISMORE INMATES 1906-11
   A. 1906-8    Entered once More than once
Healthy Ill Healthy Ill Total
Single   17   9   23   3   52
Married     3 12     2   2   19
Widowed   20 18   10   5   53
Total   40 39   35 10 124
   B. 1909-11   Entered once More than once
Healthy Ill Healthy Ill Total
Single   31 12    10  4   57
Married    5 10      0  2   17
Widowed    4 13      0    3   20
Total   40 35    10  9   94
Source: NAI, BG111/G1 and BG111/G3.
       Note: here and in Table 10b the data refer to 29 March 1906 to 24 January 1908 and 21




TABLE 10b:  HEALTH AND MARITAL STATUS, LISMORE INMATES 1906-11 
  A. 1906-8   Entered once More than once
Healthy Ill Healthy Ill Total
Male 34 25 30 6   95
Female   9 15  6   3   33
Total 43 40 36 9 128
  B. 1909-11   Entered once More than once
Healthy Ill Healthy Ill Total
Male    24 20    9  5  58
Female      8 16    2  2  28
Total    32 36   11  7  86
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4.  THE PENSION IN A FREE STATE:
    [T]he only recorded instance in which one of [the officials] was completely
dumbfounded arose from an inquiry as to whether a Home Rule Government
would be obliged to continue the remittance.
Irish Times, 2 January 1909
    Home Rule means increased taxation and no old age pensions.
Unionist claim, c. 1910
44
On the eve of independence in 1921-2 the old age pension entailed an annual transfer
of about £4 million across the Irish Sea, three-quarters of it to what would become the Irish
Free State.  Financing the pension would was going to be no fun for the fledgling Free State. 
The difficulty had been anticipated in the debate about the economics of home rule in the
1910s.  In Home Rule Finance nationalist Tom Kettle tried to have it both ways.  On the one
hand he argued that the pension was the  ￿cost of the partial liquidation of the economic decay
and the human wretchedness induced by the Union ￿ and therefore could not be considered a
 ￿purely domestic charge on Ireland ￿.  On the other he held that Ireland ￿s financial prospects
were much too bright for her to be embarrassed by her commitment to relieve  ￿destitute old
age ￿.  Eventually, claimed Kettle, the burden would fall as claimants were replaced by  ￿the
survivors of a reduced and declining population ￿.
45
The reality would not be so simple.  As early as May 1922, only a few months after the
formation of the provisional pro-Treaty government headed by Michael Collins, there were
signs of nerves about the fiscal burden imposed by the pension.  In a memo to the
Department of Finance the Minister for Local Government argued that the burden of the
pension was excessive, particularly  ￿when cognisance [was] taken of the limited funds
available to meet distress in several parts of Ireland ￿.  Nor, claimed the Minister, did the
pension always target the most needy.  He suggested an urgent examination of the matter;
Finance ￿s reply was that  ￿it would not be opportune at this stage to revise the Pension
Scheme ￿.  However, some months later a senior Finance official, Joseph Brennan, counseled27
against opening the discussion about revising the pension allowances  ￿at too small a cut ￿, and
recommended two shillings as  ￿reasonable ￿ since the cost of living was  ￿120% above pre-war
and still rising when the 10/- rate was fixed ￿.
46  The fiscal poachers were becoming strict
gamekeepers.
The issue was put on ice during the civil war, but on 2 November 1923, in the course
of a Dáil statement about fiscal retrenchment, finance minister Ernest Blythe promised a
reduction of a shilling a week in the pension.  The context  --  part of the preparation for
launching the first national loan  --  is relevant.  The cut came in 1924.  In the meantime
regulations surrounding the pension were tightened up, and spending on the old age pension
in 1923/4 was about £100,000 less than estimated.  This was in part due  ￿the reinvestigation
of old pensions with consequential reduction or disqualification ￿.
47
In the wake of the civil war the best defense of the cuts seemed to be the economic
damage inflicted on the new state by its republican opponents.
48  The huge outlays on the
army in 1922/3 and 1923/4 (£7.5 million and £10.6 million) and on compensation for
property losses (£1.2 million and £4.6 million)  were mainly civil war related.  Spending under
these headings declined thereafter, but the fiscal burden facing the state continued high by the
standards of the time.  Not only did the pension absorb a big slice of government revenue,
but both expenditure and revenue in the new Ireland were very high by contemporary
European standards.
49  In only one country out of the sixteen listed in Table 11   ￿   Belgium,
still holding out for German war reparations   ￿   did both spending and taxation ratios exceed 
the Irish Free State ￿s.  Two caveats: first, expenditure in the Irish Free State in 1923 and 1924
was bloated by non-recurring civil war-related items; second, there is an anachronistic aspect
to these comparisons, since the national accounts data that underpin them were not available
at the time.
It also bears noting that the old age pension accounted for the bulk of what would
today be deemed welfare spending in the Irish Free State.  At £3.3 million in 1922/3 it
dwarfed the outlays on relief schemes (£340,000), national health insurance (£317,000),
unemployment insurance (£284,000), and hospitals and infirmaries (£17,000), and cost28
almost as much as the total outlay on education (£4.2 million).  The pension was truly in a
class of its own; the next radical step in welfare provision in Ireland, children ￿s allowances,
would absorb only four per cent of exchequer receipts when introduced in 1944.
50
______________________________________________________________
TABLE 11:  TAXATION AND PUBLIC SPENDING IN THE MID-1920S 
 
COUNTRY YEAR G/GDP(%) T/GDP(%) 0.5(G+T)/GDP (%)
Belgium 1924  31.5    25.9    28.7    
IRELAND 1923-4  26.7  [2] 21.7  [2]   24.2  [2]
1924-5  19.3  [5]   18.6  [3]   19.0  [3]
Bulgaria 1924  22.4  15.6      19.0   
Hungary 1925  20.2      --
Greece 1928  19.7      20.5    20.1   
Italy 1923-4  17.4   14.1    15.8   
Spain 1923-4  17.2  11.9    14.6   
UK 1923-4  16.3   17.8    17.1   
Austria 1924  14.7    9.0     11.9   
NL 1923-4  14.3  9.6     12.0   
France 1923-4  11.5   8.0      9.8   
Sweden 1923-4  10.2   8.0        9.1   
Norway 1923-4   9.9    6.0          8.0   
Switzerland 1923-4   9.2    6.7         8.0   
Germany 1925   8.4    7.0      7.7   
Denmark 1923-4   6.8      6.7      6.8   
    Source: derived from Mitchell (1975); Statistical Abstract 1931, 126-7; Irish rankings
in square brackets.  Assumed Irish GDP: £145 million.
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The numbers help explain Blythe ￿s insistence that a commitment to economy that did
not include a cut in the old age pension would lack credibility.  His claim that the fall in the
cost of living justified a cut in the pension carries less conviction.  The cost-of-living index
had risen from 100 in July 1914 to 185 in June 1922, but had fallen back to only 183 by July
1924.
51 
Blythe cut the maximum weekly rate from 10s. to 9s., but spared pensioners aged
eighty years and over the cut.  He also amended the means qualifications.  Now the full rate
of 9s. would be paid only to those persons whose other means did not exceed 7s. per week
(against 10s. previously).  The new sliding scale reduced the pension by a shilling for each29
added shilling of other income, and no pension would be paid to those whose other means
exceed 15s. (as against 19s. previously).  Blythe ￿s one genuflection towards populism was the
exemption, at the behest of Mayo T.D.s, of smallholders with a valuation of less than £10
from the means test.  Moreover, the new act also sought to make qualifying more difficult for
those who divested themselves of property in order to get the pension.
52  Blythe ￿s overall
target was a saving of about £0.5 million (or about fifteen per cent) per annum.  The
outcome was a reduction in the number of old age pensioners of five per cent between 1924
and 1925, and cuts in the allowances of most of those still in receipt of their pensions (see
appendix table A6).  Before the Blythe cuts nearly everybody (92.5 per cent) qualified for the
top rate;  a year later only seventy-seven per cent did so.  The fiscal dividend was a reduction
in spending from £3.2 million in 1924 to £2.8 million in 1925 and £2.5 million in 1927. 
These changes almost certainly hit the poor most.  Critics from the left juxtaposed the
cut in the pension, on the one hand, and the reductions in the supertax rate on incomes over
£30,000 from 30 per cent to 22.5 per cent and in death duties on larger estates, on the other. 
These  ￿concessions ￿ to the super-rich were mainly symbolic  --  indeed, Blythe hoped that his
lower rates would increase the revenue generated.  But the reduction in income tax from 25
per cent in 1924 to 15 per cent in 1926 confirms the regressive direction of Cumann na
nGaedheal fiscal policy.
53
    In the course of a debate on Blythe ￿s proposals writer and senator Oliver St.John
Gogarty dismissed the pension as  ￿the vote-catching device of an English politician ￿.  Most
people would long remember Blythe ￿s measures as the vote-losing device of an Irish
politician.  Significantly, even within Cumann na nGaedheal  there was also a strong feeling
against Blythe ￿s cuts.
54  This is well captured in a series of letters between party secretary
Séamus Hughes and Blythe in September 1924.  Claiming to have  ￿met or corresponded with
at least a thousand who attack the measure without reserve ￿, Hughes argued on behalf of the
party ￿s executive that, given  ￿the prevailing poverty, the bad season, and the coming by-
elections ￿, Blythe should have first targeted fraudulent claims before revising the existing
payments.  Hughes also relayed the request that  ￿more generous considerations should be
given to the views of local pensions committees in cases of appeal ￿, and concluded with the30
reflection that in passing the Old Age Pensions Act the government seemed  ￿to have had
carried with it the votes, but not the convictions, of its own party ￿.  Blythe ￿s reply was
typically dismissive, pointing to the state of the public finances, and accusing Hughes of
reflecting  ￿the state of mind which is responsible for a good deal of harm in the country ￿. 
The party and its branches should be arguing the reasons for this measure and reconciling the
people to it, not  ￿join[ing] the ignorant and irresponsible chorus of criticism ￿.
55
Less than two months after the close of this correspondence, the government
contested five bye-elections against the anti-Treaty Republican opposition.  Hughes was
selected as his party ￿s last-minute choice in Dublin South, where he lost to a youthful Seán
Lemass.  The government ￿s candidate in Mayo North, also hastily chosen but whose 
nomination papers were signed by the  local Catholic bishop, also lost.
56  Its other three
candidates won, despite big increases in the Republican vote (Table 12).  Poor organisation
on the part of Cumann na nGaedheal and voter apathy were factors, but so was resentment at
 ￿tampering with the old age pensioners ￿.
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TABLE 12: Republican Percentage of the Vote: 
27 August 1923 and 18-20 November 1924
Constituency 1923 1924
Cork East 23.5 41.2
Dublin City South 21.1 51.4
Mayo North 39.8 51.5
Cork Borough 19.8 30.9
Donegal 17.9 42.4
Source: Walker, Irish Parliamentary Elections, 108-16
Less than four years later Blythe quietly restored the cuts made in 1924.  Whether this
was a response to opposition pressure, or something he had planned to do as soon as the
state of public finances permitted, remains unclear.
58  But it is the cuts themselves that were
remembered.  The damage done to Cumann na nGaedheal was probably out of all
proportion to the savings involved.  The cuts were as much the product of political31
inexperience as of fiscal necessity.  Their lasting unpopularity may help explain why such
transparent cuts in welfare were few in the history of twentieth-century Europe.  Though
relative reductions in welfare spending might work (e.g. by allowing welfare payments to fall
behind inflation or as a share of GDP), nominal spending levels were subject to ratchet
effects.  Will such considerations influence the shape   ￿  and the likelihood   ￿   of the cuts in
social security now being mooted throughout the developed world?
4. THE PARTY POLITICS OF THE PENSION:
     Possibly no aspect of Fianna Fáil ￿s programme better
explains the breadth and solidity of the party ￿s popular support
than the social-welfare reforms which it introduced when first in
office.
Richard Dunphy, The Making of Fianna Fáil, 177.
Much has been written about the party politics of the Irish Free State.  How a subset
of the losers in the civil war of 1922-3 could so quickly regroup, re-invent themselves, and
achieve power through the ballot-box in less than a decade, is a central theme.  Did they
simply re-model themselves as socio-economic radicals and democrats, or were the
rejectionists of 1922-3 more left-wing on economic issues from the start?  Fianna Fáil ￿s
approach to the pension issue before and after achieving power in March 1932 certainly
reflected a genuine difference in socio-economic outlook between them and Cumann na
nGaedheal.  It is also true that Fianna Fáil were more professionally organised and hungrier
for votes.  Cumann na nGaedheal did not lose votes between 1923 and 1932, but it failed to
extend its appeal to the supporters of other, smaller parties and independent deputies, as
Fianna Fáil did so successfully.  Indeed, Fianna Fáil ￿s stance on the pension and on social
policy generally in the 1930s helps explain the weakness of social democracy or labourism in
Ireland.
59
The pension became somewhat of a defining issue between Fianna Fáil and Cumann
na nGaedheal.  In November 1929 Fianna Fáil introduced, through three of their deputies, a32
bill aimed at removing the clause in the 1908 Act under which maintenance by relatives or
others was taken into account in calculating the means of a claimant.  Blythe ￿s experts in the
Department of Finance estimated the cost of the change at £0.3 million and opposed a
second reading on that basis.  Fianna Fáil ￿s bill united the opposition and on 27 March 1930
the Government was surprisingly outvoted by a narrow margin (66 votes to 64).  The debate
itself was a dull affair  --  an Irish Times reporter spotted several deputies dozing in a sparsely-
filled house  --  with very few government deputies participating.  Blythe tried to strike a
caring note, divulging (without elaboration) how  ￿for some time past the old age pension code
ha[d] been more sympathetically administered than previously ￿, and that  ￿a greater attempt
ha[d] been made to give applicants the benefit of the doubt where that was possible ￿, and
making the plausible point that adding a shilling to the 10s. already received by those
receiving the full benefit would target the truly destitute better than relaxing the means test.
60
The defeat was not a serious blow for the government which was back in business
within a few days,
61 but it symbolised an attitude that would cost it dear in two years time. 
Even the usually pro-Cumann na nGaedheal Evening Herald found the government ￿s position
 ￿rather extraordinary and, for themselves, unfortunate ￿, noting that the recent Shannon
hydroelectric scheme had cost £5 million of public money, but that shortage of funds had not
been a consideration in that instance.  The Herald could not understand  ￿the sudden desire for
economy at the expense of helpless people ￿.
62  Content with its moral victory, Fianna Fáil let
the bill drop.  In June 1931, though, through Dr. Conn Ward it introduced another private
member ￿s motion on the pension, disapproving of the Department of Local Government ￿s
refusal to allow deputies make oral representations to the responsible officials on behalf of
constituents refused the pension.  This time the government won the vote.
63
Claims that the old age pension was not safe with Cumann na nGaedheal featured
prominently in Fianna Fáil ￿s electoral campaigns in 1932 and 1933.  A sure measure of the
pension ￿s significance is that a draft of the 1929 bill, marginally amended, was presented to
the new cabinet by the Minister for Local Government and Public Health, Seán T. O ￿Kelly, at
its first meeting in April 1932.  The increasing prominence of Local Government in the new33
administration is also significant.  Conn Ward, who became O ￿Kelly ￿s junior minister,
removed the bar on deputies making representations in the same month.
64  
The fate of the bill epitomises the more radical character of the young Fianna Fáil. 
Seán McEntee, the new Minister for Finance, soon fell under the spell of his civil servants,
but his claim that the bill would cost £0.9 million a year, not the £0.25 million mooted by
Local Government
65, cut little ice with his cabinet colleagues.  Conn Ward, widely regarded as
 ￿the special advocate of the old age pensioners ￿, hoped that  ￿the section enabling farmers to
assign their farms and so allow their sons to settle down before they become old men will be
largely availed of ￿,  adding that if that section proved popular,  ￿I do not believe £300,000 a
year will meet the cost of the bill and I hope it will not ￿.
66  The bill received the Royal Assent
from the Governor General in early August 1932.
The friction between McEntee and Local Government was just one example of the
struggle between Finance and the spending departments throughout the 1930s.  A Finance
memo circulated in June 1933 noted that while the 1932 Act had virtually removed the means
test,  Section 4(3) of the 1908 Act had not been repealed.  That section stipulated that those
who deprived themselves of means in order to qualify for the pension should have such
means included in assessing their claims.  Finance believed there was  ￿ample evidence ￿ that
since the passage of the 1932 Act property transfers were being openly effected in order to
qualify for the pension in the belief that Local Government would take a lenient attitude in
the event of an appeal.  Local Government, on the other hand, encouraged such transfers. 
Conn Ward  went on record stating that  ￿due weight would be given...  to any evidence
submitted to him that any such assignment was made bona fide by the assignor, in
consequence of advancing age or infirmity, for the purpose of securing the better working or
management of the farm, or the purpose of making a family settlement ￿.  Furthermore, in an
instruction issued to the officials who decided appeals Ward stated that  ￿the Minister is, in
fact, disposed to give favourable consideration to the question of accepting assignments if it
is clear that they are not frivolous in nature ￿.  For Finance, however, the issue was clear cut: 
 ￿the well-known habits of the people of this country ￿ created a presumption against any
elderly farmer handing over property other than with the aim of getting the pension.  Thus34
the onus of rebutting that presumption should always rest on the claimant.  Finance
complained that Ward had consulted neither itself nor the Revenue Commissioners before
making his mind up, and that  --  inevitably  --   ￿a departure from strict interpretation of the
law [would], if allowed, have a serious effect on the Exchequer ￿.
67    
The 1933 Finance memo revealed that on the eve of Fianna Fáil ￿s victory just over
one appeal in five on questions relating to means was decided in favour of the claimants.  A
year later nearly all such appeals were so decided.  Finance also bristled at the treatment of
appeals relating to age.  The Act of 1932 had made no change to the law in that respect, but
still the proportion of appeals decided in favour of claimants rose from half to three-quarters
or more of the cases submitted.  Since, Finance reasoned, appeals were lodged only when
pensions officers were not reasonably satisfied that the claimants had reached the statutory
age, one might have expected most appeals to be decided in favour of the pensions officer,
whereas the opposite was the case.  Finance therefore called for  ￿a fair and impartial
administration of the existing law ￿ to prevent the cost of pensions from getting out of
control.  Unless Local Government discontinued  ￿their present illegal method of deciding
cases ￿, the vast bulk of the eleven thousand appeals outstanding would be decided in favour
of the claimants.  Continuing along that path would rapidly increase the annual outlay on
pensions to £3.75 million, a rise of a £1 million since the passage of the Act, half of which
would be due to the  ￿lax administration of the Act ￿.   It recommended the urgency of
requiring Local Government to revert to  ￿the normal practice ￿ as regard interpreting Section
4(3) of the 1908 Act.  This would mean reversing Ward ￿s instructions, and finding for a new
way of assessing means.  If Local Government ￿s policy was to continue,  ￿the Attorney
General has advised that legislation will be necessary ￿.
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McEntee continued to pester the cabinet with memos about the pension, pleading that
Local Government ￿s interpretation of the law was creating  ￿a most alarming increase in the
present and future cost of the service ￿.  On 25 May 1934 it was decided that the two
departments and the revenue commissioners should sort out the issue between them and
report back on how best to control pension spending.  Doubtless due to the continuing
tension between Finance and Local Government, no such report ensued.  In what seems like35
a further snub to Finance, the government then instructed Local Government in May 1935 to
carry out a review itself and produce  ￿such saving as would result from a review by an inter-
Departmental committee of existing awards ￿.  That sum was set at £100,000.  This must have
seemed like a victory for the populists in Local Government, but in the event there was some
pruning. Still, by December 1936 McEntee was again complaining about  ￿laxity in the
administration of the Acts has again made its appearance ￿.
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Though the outlay on the old age pension rose significantly in the early years of
Fianna Fáil power, the rise was responsible for only a small share of the increase in aggregate
public spending.  Other Fianna Fáil projects, such as land reform, housing, and export
bounties, bulked much larger.
70  After 1932 opposition fire would be repeatedly directed at
overall spending levels.  Although the pension would continue to be a significant item in
public spending for many years to come  --  non-contributory pensions would still account
for 9.7 per cent of current expenditure in 1950 and 5.5 per cent in 1965/6  -- by the late
1930s it had ceased to be a hot political issue.  The virtual disappearance under Fianna Fáil of 
parliamentary questions about individual claims reflects the change.  Under Cumann na
nGaedheal (1922-32) over three hundred such questions had been put, usually met with
routine rejections from government spokesmen; under Fianna Fáil they were rare by the mid-
1930s.  1933 (thirty-seven parliamentary questions) is an exception to this, but many of that
year ￿s questions concerned delays in processing applications, and the replies were usually
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sympathetic to the claimant. 
5. CONCLUSION:
When Sir Henry Robinson, long-serving head of the Irish Local Government Board,
dubbed the old age pension  ￿the greatest blessing of all ￿, he was not far wrong.
72  No other
welfare measure in twentieth century Ireland would match it.  Ironically, the measure was not
framed with Ireland in mind.  Indeed the history of the old age pension in Ireland was one of
unintended consequences.
73  First, the pension was the outcome of a long political debate in
Britain, introduced (in the words of one Irish rural sociologist)  ￿to alleviate the miseries of old
age amongst the industrial workers of England ￿.  Yet its consequences would prove far most36
dramatic in the very different setting of rural Ireland.  Second, the pension would prove a
fiscal nightmare both for the Liberal administration which introduced it and, in the 1920s, for
the first Free State administration which had to live with it.  That administration ￿s handling of
the pension issue presaged its ultimate downfall in 1932.  Third, meant to exclude freeloading
malingerers, in Ireland the pension attracted thousands of fraudsters of a different and
unexpected kind.  Finally, though intended at first to exclude those whose lack of character
and foresight had left them dependent on the poor law, the pension would end up by
relieving thousands of the indignities of poor relief.  So the pension deserves more attention
than it has got in the literature.
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TABLE A.1: COHORT SURVIVAL:  MEN AND WOMEN
 AGED 45-74 IN THE CENSUS 1861-1911
Age Cohort Males Females
  1861   1871   1861   1871
45-54(1861) 261,889 204,719 285,639 220,167
55-64(1861) 204,801 111,823 224,155 112,968
65-74(1861)  87,228  39,110  96,893  44,346
45-74(1861) 553,918 355,652 606,687 377,481
  1871   1881   1871   1881
45-54(1871) 224,532 171,818 252,265 192,302
55-64(1871) 204,719 105,962 220,167 107,609
65-74(1871) 111,823  46,839 112,968  46,836
45-74(1871) 541,074 324,619 585,400 346,747
  1881    1891   1881   1891
45-54(1881) 213,639 163,081 229,416 171,060
55-64(1881) 171,818  92,462 192,302  98,747
65-74(1881) 105,962  44,120 107,609  46,088
45-74(1881) 491,419 299,663 529,327 315,895
  1891   1901   1891   1901
45-54(1891) 217,927 169,192 240,696 182,015
55-64(1891) 163,081  96,301 171,060  94,637
65-74(1891)  92,462  38,074  98,747  39,739
45-74(1891) 473,470 303,567 510,503 316,391
  1901   1911   1901   1911
45-54(1901) 194,474 137,710 218,987 144,771
55-64(1901) 169,192 143,989 182,015 170,219
65-74(1901)  96,301   52,593  94,637   57,823
45-74(1901) 459,967 334,652 495,639 372,813
__________________________________________________________________________40
TABLE A2:  NUMBER OF PENSIONS PAYABLE ON THE LAST FRIDAY OF MARCH
Country    1909   1910    1911    1912    1913    1914    1915    1916     1917    1918   1919
England  369037  414108  575789  602441  626753  642161  648868  647109   629787  630909  618845
Wales   24663   27381   38084   40483   41890   42474   42537   42001    40606   40800   39973
Scotland  70294   76889   91805   94319   96239   97294   96895   95277    91656   90500   87681
Ireland  183500  180974  201783  205317  203036  202202  198930  193725   185731  180868  173699
Total    647494  699352  907160  942160  967928  984131  987238  978112   947780  943007  920198
Irish (%) 28.3   25.9     22.2    22.6    21.0    20.5    20.2    19.8     19.6    19.2    18.9
TABLE A3: PROI SEARCHES BY COUNTY, 1910-1922
Antrim 2,187  Kildare   156 Roscommon  1,052
Armagh 1,109  Kilkenny   228 Sligo    954
Carlow    84    Kings   359 Tipperary    366
Cavan 1,227  Leitrim   580 Tyrone     1,393
Clare 1,084  Limerick   688 Waterford    294
Cork 1,298  Longford     342 Westmeath    232
Donegal 1,830  Londonderry 1,095 Wexford    502
Down 1,956  Louth   354 Wicklow    134
Dublin   374  Mayo         2,954
Fermanagh   879    Meath   360 Total 29,087
Galway 2,655  Monaghan   866
Kerry 1,360  Queens   135
Source: NAI, Cen/S/1-32.41
_____________________________________________________________________
TABLE A4: WORKHOUSE INMATES 1904-1914
  Date Infirmaries Aged/Infirm     Ch<15 M/Ch   Lunatics/etc     Other  Total
02/04/04  15663 13984          5905 801    2892         4699 43944
01/10/04   14055 12847          5244 727    2815         4165 39853
08/04/05  15307 14064          5779 773    2816         4961 43700
07/10/05  13294 13576          5638 694    2711         4588 41131
07/04/06  15426 14512          6039 734    2735         5006 44452
06/10/06  13785 13731          5507 689    2712         4378 40802  
06/04/07  15033 14479          5727 714    2687         4774 43414
05/10/07  13753 13678          5468 676    2649         4373 40597  
04/04/08  15792 15299          5891 779    2487         5040 45288  
03/10/08  13912 14281          5492 701    2443         4466 41295  
03/04/09  15474 14307          5434 772    2468         5083 43538  
02/10/09  13710 12650          5016 649    2422         4135 38582  
02/04/10  15084 13042          5196 690    2364         4588 40964  
01/10/10  13665 12036          4920 633    2308         3775 37337  
01/04/11  14815 11051          5220 671    2229         4331 38317
07/10/11  13454 10102          4870 624    2297         4095 35442  
06/04/12  14356 10668          5050 636    2304         4387 37401  
05/10/12  13307     9808          4575 588    2213         3744 34235  
05/04/13  14915 10139          4809 608    2131         3971 36573
04/10/13  13132  9304          4229 515    2098         3424 32697
04/04/14  14803        9854          4509  564    2114         3772 35636  
03/10/14  12984       8928          4125  487    2050         3191 31765  
% change
04/08-04/14   -6.3  -35.6          -23.5  -27.6    -15.0        -25.2  -21.3
 Note: M/ch = woman admitted in order to give birth 
______________________________________________________________________________________
 
TABLE A5: VARIABLES USED IN TABLES 6 AND 7 
(mean values in parentheses)
OAPPROP (1.14): pensions in force 1912 per thousand 1901 population aged 70
and over [HC 1912 vol. XLI,  ￿Returns of the old age pensions in
Ireland ￿ [3.], 247.
OVER70 (4.52): percentage aged over 70 in 1901
PCILLIT (23.53): percent illiterate aged 40 and above
VALPOP (£4.246):  poor law valuation per head per head in 1901
MISREP (0.652) proportionate increase in the percentage over seventy years
between 1901 and 1911
URBAN dummy variable set at one for counties Dublin, Cork, Antrim,
Londonderry, Limerick, Waterford
PCCATH (80.89) percent Catholic in 1911
AGROCC (53.58) percentage in agricultural occupations in 1911 (defined as
percentage share of occupational Class I in the sum of Classes I
to V).42
_____________________________________________________________
TABLE A6: Number of pensions payable end March 
Per week   1924  1925
   10s. 112,439  29,693
     9s.          -  59,609
     8s.     3,755    7,759
     7s.         -    4,062
     6s.     4,121    6,899
     5s.         -    1,927
     4s.     2,035    2,250
     3s.         -    1,660
     2s.        432    1,323
     1s.          63       635
Total  122,845 115,817
   Source: Statistical Abstract 1931, 102.  Blind pensions
represented 2-3 per cent of these numbers. 
_____________________________________________________________
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